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Application of the Cournot and Stackelberg 
Mixed Duopoly Models for Mexican Real Estate 
Market   
Vitaliy V. Kalashnikov, Daniel Flores Curiel, and Javier González* 
Abstract. This paper investigates the Mexican real estate market, especially the 
economy class homes. This sector plays an important role for Mexican social sta-
bility. Authors investigate the Cournot and Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly models 
where there is a competition between a state-owned public firm maximizing do-
mestic social surplus, and a private firm, which maximizes its own profit. Such 
models are used for modeling markets with low number of participants and high 
impact of government.  
1  Introduction 
The crediting system has a crucial role for the society in Mexico due to many rea-
sons. Some of them are: the deficit of apartments in the renting segment. Next, the 
problem of poverty is still very important to Mexico, as around 50% of population 
have monthly incomes below 3000-4000 pesos. This part of population depends 
on the state-owned projects of the construction and financing the real estate.  
One of the most important projects is INFONAVIT system. Every officially 
working citizen has a saving account, to where the part of paid tax is being trans-
ferred. On house/apartment purchase, one can use saved money and the rest of real 
estate’s volume is financed with credit. This credit has governmental guaranties in 
case of a default.      
The computational game theoretic modeling tool offered in this paper is com-
posed as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP).  Numerical experiments are 
programmed in computing language GAMS.  
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This paper is structured as follows: the introduction is followed by the section 
with mathematical description. The analysis of obtained average credit rates and 
conclusions will finish the paper. 
At the present time, the mortgage system (both private and public sectors) is of-
fering changing and fixed interest rates. Fixed rates are around 11-16% and spe-
cial rates are about 7-8%, but being calculated on the base of minimal salaries. If 
inflation rate is higher than salary increments, the credit giving bank counts a loss 
in real money value. If minimum salary grows faster than the inflation, the bank 
has an increase in actual credit value. During last years, as the figure 1 illustrates, 
in average there is an increase of the minimal salary and inflation state quite con-
stant (4.5%)  (Villar (2007)).   
 
Fig. 1 The relationships between minimal salaries and inflation rate in Mexico. 
The reason for using Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg Mixed models is mainly 
discussed in Section 2.1.  These models are very popular for modeling markets 
with oligopolistic structures. 
2  Formulation of Models 
2.1  Formulation of the Model and Cournot-Nash Equilibrium 
An examination of mixed oligopolies, in which social surplus-maximizing public 
firms compete against profit-maximizing private firms, have become increasingly 
popular in recent years. For pioneering works on mixed oligopolies, see Merrill 
and Schneider (1966), Harris and Wiens (1980), and Bös (1986, 1991). Excellent 
surveys can be found in Vickers and Yarrow (1988), De Fraja and Delbono 
(1990), Nett (1993). 
The interest in mixed oligopolies is high because of their importance in econo-
mies worldwide (see Matsushima and Matsumura, 2003) for analysis of “herd be-
havior” by private firms in many branches of the economy in Japan.  
In the paper by Matsumura (2003), the author investigates mixed duopoly and 
analyzes a desirable role (either leader or follower) of the public firm. This paper 
examines the desirable roles of both the foreign private agent and the domestic 
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public firm. The following figure gives a graphical interpretation for different 
types of models (STRA: Cournot Nash model, STACK : Stackelberg, COMP : 
perfect competition). 
 
Fig. 2 Social policy: lower interest rates under same type of the model. 
A mathematically extended version of applied model by Kalashnikov et al. 
(2007) was published in the Proceedings of the 2nd ICICI Conference. 
As discussed in sections above, market with two firms offering a homogeneous 
product (credit) . Let G  represent the total credit output, and ( )p G  denote an 
inverse demand function, i.e. the interest rate consumer has to pay. Let 
,i tq i=1,2,   
t=1,…,n, denote the output of firm i  using the capital source t. Same list of 
sources both private and public firms has been assumed. At last, let 
, ,
( )i t i tc q stand for the production cost by firm i for the technology t. As G  is the 
total output, one has  
 1, 2,
1
( )
n
t t
t
G q q
=
= +∑    .                       (1) 
Firm 1 is a foreign private firm, which maximizes its own profits, and firm 2 is a 
domestic public firm that maximizes domestic social surplus. Domestic social sur-
plus S is the sum of consumer surplus and profits of firm 2, and is given by: 
     2 1, 2, 2,
10
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
G n
t t t
t
S G q p x dx p G q c q
=
⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦∑∫  ;           (2) 
here, of course      2 2, 1 1, 1 2
1 1
, ,
n n
t t
t t
q q q q q G q
= =
= = = −∑ ∑ . 
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The profit of firm 1 is given by: 1 1, 1, 1,
1
( , ) ( ) ( )
n
t t t
t
G q p G q c q
=
Π = −∑ .   (3) 
First consider the classical Cournot equilibrium, i.e., a vector 
2 1
1,1 1, 2,1 2,( , ,..., , ,..., ) nn nZ G q q q q R ++= ∈ , such that: 
2
,
1 1
n
i t
t i
G q
= =
= ∑∑ ,                                  (4)                              
 
' '
1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
1,t 1,t
0,   ( ) ( ) ( )
0,  0 
t t t t tq c q q p G p G
q t
φ
φ
≥ ≡ − −
≥ = ∀
;            (5)                              
' '
2, 2, 2, 2, 2,
2, 2,
0,   ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 0,   0,   
t t t t t
t t
q c q G q p G
p G q t
φ
φ
≥ ≡ + −
− ≥ = ∀
.             (6) 
Problem (4) – (6) is a standard complementarity problem. Therefore, applying 
analogous methods as in Kalashnikov et al. (2007), one can obtain the existence 
and the uniqueness of the equilibrium. 
2.2  Stackelberg Model with Leadership of Domestic (Public) 
Firm 
First, in this Section, the game where firm 2 (public one) is the leader is examined. 
Firm 2 chooses its output volume 2, ,   1,...,tq t n= , and firm 1 (private one) 
chooses 1, ,   1,...,tq t n=  after having observed  2, ,   1,...,tq t n= , so as to 
maximize its net profit 
1 1 1, 1,
1
( , ) ( ) ( )
n
t t
t
G q p G q c q
=
Π = −∑ ,                 (7) 
where 2 2, 1 1, 1 2
1 1
, ,
n n
t t
t t
q q q q q G q
= =
= = = −∑ ∑ . 
Let  1 1 2( ) 0q q q= ≥ be the (optimal) reaction function of firm 1; that is, the 
value that satisfies    the equality: 
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1 1 2 1 2
1
1 1 2 1 2
( ( )) ( , ( )) 0,  and
( ( )) ( ) 0
q q G q q
q
q q q q
φ
φ
∂
≡ Π ≤
∂
⋅ =
            (8) 
Definition 2.2.1. A Stackelberg equilibrium (with the domestic firm as a leader 
and the foreign firm as a follower) is the vector 
, 2
1,1 1,( , ( ),..., ( ), )F L F L F L L nnZ G q Q q Q Q R ++= ∈   such that                        
 { }, 1,
1
( )
n
F L F L L
t
t
G q Q Q
=
= +∑ ,                      (9)  
( ){ }1max    0LQ Arg S Q Q∈ ≥ ,                 (10) 
( ) ( ){ },1 1 1arg max ,    0F L F Lq Q G q q= Π ≥ .            (11)    
where 2,
1
n
L L
t
t
Q q
=
= ∑ - total output of the domestic company and  
1 1,
1
( )
n
F F L
t
t
q q Q
=
= ∑ - optimal response of the private firm. The following three re-
lationships    
1
L FG Q q= + ,                              (12)      
' '
1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
1, 1,t
0,   ( ) ( )
( ) 0,   0 
F F F
t t t t t
F
t
q c q q p G
p G q
ψ
ψ
≥ ≡ −
− ≥ = ∀
;                 (13) 
' '
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2,
2, 2,
0,   ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 0,   0,   
L L L
t t t t t t
t t
q c q G q p G
p G q t
ψ
ψ
≥ ≡ + −
− ≥ = ∀
         (14) 
define a complementarity problem, analogous to the one discussed in Kalashnikov 
et al. (2007). 
2.3  Stackelberg Model with Leadership of Foreign (Private) Firm  
Now consider the game where firm 1 (foreign private firm) is a leader. Firm 1 
chooses it 1, ,   1,...,tq t n=   and firm 2 (domestic or public supplier) chooses 
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2, ,   1,...,tq t n=  after having observed  1, ,   1,...,tq t n= , so as to maximize 
domestic social surplus: 
2 1, 2, 2,
10
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
G n
t t t
t
S G q p x dx p G q c q
=
⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦∑∫           (15) 
where 2 2, 1 1, 1 2
1 1
, ,
n n
t t
t t
q q q q q G q
= =
= = = −∑ ∑ .                                                      
Definition 2.3.1. A Stackelberg equilibrium (with the foreign firm as a leader and 
the domestic firm as a follower) is the vector 
, 2
1 2,1 1 2, 1( , , ( ),..., ( ))L F L F L F L nnZ G Q q Q q Q R ++= ∈  such that         
                        ( ), 1 2 1L F L F LG Q q Q= + ,                      (16) 
                   ( ){ }1 1 1 1max  0LQ Arg Q Q∈ Π ≥ ,                 (17) 
              ( ) ( ){ },2 2 2arg max ,  0F L L Fq Q S G q q= ≥ .             (18) 
where 1,
1
n
L L
t
t
Q q
=
= ∑ - total output of the private firm and 2 2,
1
( )
n
F F L
t
t
q q Q
=
=∑ -
optimal response of the domestic company. Following three sentences 
                                 2
L FG Q q= + ,                         (19)                              
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1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
1, 1,t
0,   ( ) ( )
( ) 0,   0 
L L L
t t t t t
F
t
q c q q p G
p G q t
ϕ
ϕ
≥ ≡ −
− ≥ = ∀
;            (20)                              
   
' '
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2,
2, 2,
0,   ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 0,   0,   
F F F
t t t t t t
F
t t
q c q G q p G
p G q t
ϕ
ϕ
≥ ≡ + −
− ≥ = ∀
      (21) 
define a complementarity problem, analogous with to the one discussed in Ka-
lashnikov et al. (2007). 
2.4  Perfect Competition  
Besides, it is instructive to compare the values of the produced electricity in cases 
of oligopolistic behaviors with the total value of the perfect competition equili-
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brium, that is, when  the producers ignore variations in price and solve the fol-
lowing complementarity problem: Find a 1 2,q q  such that  
              
( ) ( ) ( ( )) 0,
and  ( ) 0,   1,2,
i i i i
i i
q c q p G q
q q i
β
β
′≡ − ≥
= ∀ =
                (22) 
and the total value of the electricity produced in the perfect competition scenario 
is equal 1 2G q q= + .  The inverse demand is:   
  
( )
o
o
p GG D
p
σ⎛ ⎞
= ⋅⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
  ,                        (23) 
where 
o
D reference credit demand, 
o
p weighted average interested rate on the 
credit,  σ  - elasticity parameter. 
3  Theoretical Results 
In order to illustrate obtained theoretical results, numerical experiments for the 
classical Cournot-Nash model and the mixed Cournot-Nash one were performed.   
For the inverse demand function, the function of form (23) has been chosen.  
Elasticity parameter σ  was assumed to be equal to 0.9., which refer to  depen-
dence of the credit volumes on the interest rate (Figure 3) .This figure represents 
the increase in time of the total credit volume (billions of pesos), the inflation 
rates, and the average interest rates respectively.  
 
Fig. 3 Total credit volume, the inflation rate, average interest. (Source: Bank of Mexico) 
The socially-oriented model offers the credit rates under the existing rates – 
around 6.7%. The classical model yields the equilibrium rate equal to 9.3%, which 
is still lower than actually offered rates.  This difference can be explained by  
underestimation of non-payment risks, which is a goal of the further analysis. 
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4  Conclusion 
In the above analysis, we investigated three different types of equilibrium in the 
duopoly with a private (foreign) agent aiming at maximization of its own profit, 
and a domestic firm maximizing domestic social surplus. After presenting the 
Cournot equilibrium in the above-described model, we examined two versions of 
Stackelberg game, with the private firm as a leader and domestic one as a follow-
er, and vice versa.  
In order to compare the equilibrium volumes in various scenarios we introduce 
the concepts of a weak and a strong firm, in dependence on the sign of the agent’s 
optimal reaction function’s derivative at the Cournot equilibrium. With such a 
characteristic, it turns out that if the inverse demand function is convex, then the 
state owned market agent is always weak, and vice versa: if the inverse demand 
function is concave, then the domestic agent is always strong.  
For the Stackelberg equilibrium with the public owned agent as a leader, we 
obtain that the production volume by the leader (and hence, the total cleared mar-
ket volume) is higher than that in the Cournot equilibrium, if the private firm (the 
follower) is strong. Otherwise, if the private agent is weak, then the total cleared 
market volume is lower with the domestic producer as a leader (Kalashnikov et al. 
(2007)). 
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